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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of innovation on the organizational structure.
The theoretical framework predicts that a larger parental pool of knowledge
raises the probability of offshoring. This holds in a national as well as an in-
ternational context. However, when the producer loses territorial protection,
the changeover from non-integration to integration is delayed. Employing
data on German firms investing in Eastern Europe finds empirical evidence
for the theoretical predictions. The results are robust to different measure-
ments and an instrumental variable regression.
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1 Introduction
In a global economy, the international make-or-buy decision offers firms the
option to relocate its activities within its firm environment or outside its firm
boundaries, either at home (national integration versus outsourcing) and/or
abroad (offshoring versus international outsourcing).1 Especially due to cor-
porate knowledge and its related risks, this raises the question of whether it is
more interesting to outsource or to in-source. On the one hand, outsourcing
frees resources and saves labor costs (Glass and Saggi 2001). On the other
hand, integration reduces the classical hold-up problem as argued within the
“transaction cost economies” (Williamson 1975). Therefore, integration is
preferred over outsourcing (non-integration) in order to circumvent the firm-
specific hold-up problem. That is, theory creates a link between transaction
costs and uncertainty arguing to reduce the ex-post hold-up problem via
vertical integration that arises from ex-ante investments and opportunism
(Williamson 1975, 1985).2
This paper studies the determinants of the national and international
ownership structure of German firms considering their innovational capaci-
ties. More precisely, it addresses the following question: How does a pool
of knowledge, in particular a pool of patents belonging to the parent firm,
influence the organizational relationship within a national as well as inter-
national context? Following Acemoglu et al. (2004), the theoretical part
develops a relationship between innovation and the organizational structure.
It argues that the decision to integrate or not depends on the parties’ pool of
knowledge and its related territorial environment. Comparing costs and ben-
efits, vertical integration strengthens the position of the firm’s owner whereas
outsourcing is more likely to maintain the suppliers’ active participation.3 It
1 See Marin (2006).
2 See Acemoglu et al. (2004).
3 The intuition is provided by the “property rights theory” (Grossman and Hart 1986
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allows to develop a combination of the parent’s and affiliates’ innovation pool
with the decision for an organizational structure between the two parties for
each geographical breakdown.
Against the traditional perception that innovative firms want to protect
their knowledge within integration, even highly innovative enterprises are in-
terested in cost savings and therefore non-integrational relationships. Thus,
the following Section 2 presents a literature review on knowledge in terms of
research and development (R&D) and patents. It starts with a broader size of
theoretical literature discussing two controversial directions of the influence
of innovation on outsourcing. It addresses mainly an contra intuitive empir-
ical finding that a higher R&D intensity is related to more outsourcing (Mol
2005, p.581). The section gives also an short overview about the understand-
ing of inventiveness and innovation and presents the German position within
international innovation activities. Section 3 develops the general framework
beginning in a national context. The underlying model follows Acemoglu et
al. (2004), also describing in this section the authors’ framework in more de-
tail. It shows that a larger pool of knowledge on the producer level increases
the likelihood of integration. The opposite holds if the subsidiaries’ pool of
innovations increases. Against Acemoglu et al. (2004), the model is also
extended to the international context. It is assumed that patent applications
granted domestically do not hold in the foreign environment. Despite this
characteristic, to a certain threshold the outcome of non-integration is more
likely with an increasing pool of knowledge compared with the national case.
That is, the changeover from the closed to the open territorially unprotected
case delays the probability of integration with an increasing producer’s in-
novation pool. Beside that, the larger the supplier’s outside option and the
larger the fraction the producer can keep in a potential ex-post break-up,
and Hart and Moore 1990). See also Acemoglu et al. (2004) and Brusoni, Prencipe, and
Pavitt (2001) considering aircraft engine manufacturers.
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the more likely is non-integration. This holds in both cases. Section 4 de-
scribes the underlying data, summary statistic of the employed variables and
the basic estimation equation. It presents the empirical results using data
on German investment projects in home and in Central and Eastern Europe
in 2005. It is based on a unique data matching of the pan-European micro
database Amadeus provided by the Bureau von Dijk and firm-specific patent
data provided by the German Patent and Trade Mark Office.4 The findings
are in line with the theoretical predictions. A German parent firm and its
corresponding partner are more likely to be integrated when the German
downstream firm (DSF) is highly innovative and the domestic or foreign up-
stream firm (USF) is less innovative. This holds for the national as well as
the international case and for different measures of innovativeness. More-
over, the difference between Home and Foreign shows a deduction in the
likelihood of integration. Intuitively, owing to additional investment incen-
tives outsourcing holds longer in the international context than the national
case.5 The following subsection discusses the robustness of the empirical
findings. Finally, Section 5 concludes and encourages future work in this
field of investigation.
2 Innovation and the Firm Structure
2.1 A Literature Survey
The existing literature yields two controversial aspects of innovation and its
association with the organizational relationship between a parent firm and its
4 See Bureau von Dijk (2005) and GPTO (2008a, 2008b, 2008c).
5 The empirical framework is motivated by Acemoglu et al. (2004), McLaren (2000),
Antras and Helpman (2004), Marin (2006), and Nunn and Trefler (2007). It is closely
related to a wide strand of literature concerning vertical structure, international trade,
and growth: Aghion and Tirole (1997), Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002), Grossman
and Helpman (2002, 2003, and 2004), and Bartel, Lach, and Sicherman (2005).
3
affiliate.6 The “traditional view” (Mol 2005, p.572) states that a larger pool
of innovations increases the likelihood of integration. Contrary, innovation
also has the potential to increase the likelihood of outsourcing.
The perspective that innovation and knowledge reflect a negative extent
of outsourcing is discussed by a huge amount of literature. Stigler (1951)
applies it to vertical integration by considering economies of scale. Due to
large fixed costs, highly innovative firms decide in favor of integration to ex-
ploit economies of scale that can be more easily recuperated by large firms.
Moreover, integration raises essential knowledge, makes entry by new firms
less likely, and helps to enforce price discrimination (Stigler 1951, p.191).
Considering complementary assets, Teece (1986) argues that integration is
an important strategic instrument for highly innovative firms. He argues that
integration is preferable for obtaining additional assets. The greater the im-
portance of these complementary assets to the innovator and the more critical
these assets to the firm’s success in terms of time and budget, the more likely
integration is from an innovator’s perspective.7 In the paper’s context, the
innovator integrates to protect the original innovation as well as to enhance
the value of the existing knowledge.8 Antras and Helpman (2004) present a
north-south model of international trade in which final good-producing firms
located in the north may decide to keep the input production within their
boundaries or to outsource it to an independent supplier. Beside the interme-
diate good to create the final good, the producer needs headquarter services,
which are solely produced by the final-good producer itself at home (north).
Because investments and output are neither verifiable nor contractible, the
outside options determine the organizational structure via ex-post bargain-
ing. As already mentioned, investment incentives are larger for the supplier
6 See Mol (2005).
7 See Teece (1986, p.290) calling this outcome “integrating into specialized and cospe-
cialized assets”.
8 See also Mol (2005), p.574.
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under non-integration than vertical integration. In contrast, in the case of
integration, incentives to invest are larger for the producer because of the in-
creased outside option. Hence, the outcome of the organizational structure is
defined by the investment incentives of the more important party within the
relationship. In the headquarter-intensive sector, Antras and Helpman (2004)
show that only the most productive firms choose integration over outsourcing
domestically as well as abroad. Following Antras and Helpman (2004), the
empirical studies by Marin (2006) and Nunn and Trefler (2007) estimate the
determinants of the organizational structure. Both find empirical evidence
that knowledge has a positive influence on integration. Marin (2006) finds a
significant negative coefficient of the capital-to-labor ratio and a significant
positive impact of R&D expenditures on intra-firm imports from Eastern Eu-
rope to Germany. That is, her data on German and Austrian firms investing
in Eastern Europe suggest that the larger the headquarter intensity and the
larger the R&D expenditures, the more likely is integration. Concerning
R&D expenditures, the results also hold in probit estimations differing be-
tween outsourcing and offshoring in terms of the ownership share. Nunn
and Trefler (2007) show that the share of U.S. imports’ capital intensity has
a positive influence on intra-firm imports. Moreover, patent citations over
total value added as a proxy for knowledge have a positive but insignificant
impact on integration. Hence, the data affirm the theoretical predictions
arguing that a pool of knowledge reduces the likelihood of outsourcing.
The number of empirical analyses presenting a negative impact of in-
novation on outsourcing is large. Louri, Loufir, and Papanastassiou (2002)
report a negative correlation between R&D intensity and the likelihood of
outsourcing. For Greek data on 216 multinational firms, the authors show
a positive influence of R&D intensity on fully owned affiliates. Distinguish-
ing between an integrated or non-integrated relationship, Monteverde (1995)
runs a probit estimation in the semiconductor industry on patents. The
number of patents held by each firm is positively correlated with integration.
This is in line with the theory’s predictions. However, the impact is not
significant. Increasing costs of monitoring as well as technology spillovers
are risks that have to be taken into account.9 From an innovator’s perspec-
tive, this suggests preferring integration over non-integration. Mugele and
Schnitzer (2006) find that technology is the determining variable that in-
creases the investors’ ownership share. The authors distinguish between a
production-intensive, a technology-intensive, as well as a marketing-intensive
sector, whereas the technology-intensive sector is more likely to integrate.
As briefly mentioned at the beginning of this section, there are also ar-
guments in favor of non-integration with an increasing pool of knowledge.
A study by Mol (2005) analyzing the impact of R&D intensity on vertical
integration within the Dutch manufacturing sector shows that the negative
extent of outsourcing at the beginning of the 1990s seems to have shifted.
He shows that R&D intensity has a positive impact on changes in the ris-
ing external sourcing structure. In more detail, the results refer to interna-
tional outsourcing, suggesting that the “traditional view” (Mol 2005, p.572)
where R&D intensity discourages outsourcing may no longer hold. Mol (2005,
p.579) argues that the increasing technological requirements force the firm
to outsource. The corporation is not able to develop and implement all the
necessary technologies by itself. Moreover, the positive extent of outsourcing
is intensified in an environment characterized by rapid technological change
(Harrigan 1984, 1985, Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt 1986, Bartel, Lach, and
Sicherman, 2005). When a firm has to act in such a frequently changing
environment, innovators prefer outsourcing over integration to circumvent
perseverative adaptation costs.10 Bartel et al. (2005) develop a framework
that describes the pace of technological change and its impact on the or-
9 See also Louri et al. (2002), p.33.
10 For a more detailed discussion of the IT sector, see Bartel et al. (2005).
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ganizational structure. Within their model, a faster pace of technological
developments results in more outsourcing to reduce the adaptation costs of
producing in-house. Therefore, the final good-producing firm can always use
the latest technology without incurring additional fixed costs (Bartel et al.
2005, p.12). Within the empirical study, the authors show that, in the case of
a great sectoral IT dependency, purchasing services outside is more likely.11
Hence, outsourcing is a possibility to circumvent fixed costs, avail lower fac-
tor prices, and, beside that, to use a potential network offering innovativeness
and therefore the chance to follow the technological advance at lower costs.12
Thus, outsourcing offers the chance to stay up to date with both the
firm’s competitive surroundings and the innovative environment. Empey
(1988) analyzes that outsourcing of services by manufacturing industries in-
creases faster in sectors where technological change and productivity play a
decisive role. Involving the costs of the well-known hold-up problem seems
to weigh less than reduced labor costs, costs of technological spillovers, and
decreasing supplier’s investment incentives. Moreover, Mol et al. (2004) find
that product innovation has a positive impact on the scope of international
outsourcing and Maskell et al. (2005) argue that even innovative processes
are outsourced..13
2.2 Invention and Innovation
The existing literature reveals different definitions of innovation. As defined
in the Oslo Manual by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD 2005, p.46), innovation is “the implementation of a new or
significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new market-
ing method, or a new organizational method in business practices, workplace
11 See Atallah (2002) for a very similar discussion on the IT sector.
12 See also Quinn (2000).
13 In contrast, Mol et al. (2005) also argue that innovation is negatively associated with
the depth of international outsourcing. However, there is no empirical evidence for this.
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organization or external relations”. Thompson (1965, p.2) defines innova-
tion as “[...] the generation, acceptance, and implementation of new ideas,
processes, products, or services. [...] it implies the capacity to change or
adapt.” By the Commission of the European Communities (1991), innova-
tion is defined by new products and processes. Damanpour (1991) uses the
development and adaption of ideas whereas Drazin and Schoonhoven (1996)
define it as a competitive advantage. Moreover, innovation has to be sep-
arated from invention. That is, invention in terms of new ideas precedes
innovation that turns those ideas into new products and processes (Baddeley
and Barrowclough 2009).
Innovation is often measured as R&D expenditures. Becker and Dietz
(2002) use the in-house R&D expenditures-to-sales ratio of German corpora-
tions for the firm’s intensity in inventiveness and developing new products.
Their results suggest that R&D cooperation is a significant explanatory fac-
tor of innovation in the German manufacturing industry. Marin, Lorentow-
icz, and Raubold (2003) present R&D expenditures as a percentage of parent
sales of German firms during the 1990s to measure technology and innovative
activity. They conclude that the highly innovative German segment invests
in Eastern Europe to exploit lower wages via foreign direct investment (FDI).
Greeve (2003) studies the Japanese shipbuilding industry. Within his study,
he employs R&D expenditures as a measure of innovative search activities.
Zhang et al. (2005) investigate the link between a firm’s knowledge base and
its tendency towards collaboration. Using R&D intensity between 1993 and
2002, the authors give evidence for international biotechnology alliances and
find, inter alia, that firms with intensive technological knowledge are less
likely to enter alliances.14
R&D covers knowledge and is commonly used as an empirical proxy for
innovation input. It is an essential element in the innovative process (Bad-
14 See also Mol (2005) for a similar discussion.
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deley and Barrowclough 2009). However, R&D is a source or the input of
innovation but it does not represent the output of the innovative activity
(OECD 2005). Especially when considering the innovative output, that is
new processes, products and upcoming market launches, R&D expenditures
are unsatisfying. Therefore, patents are much more suitable for represent-
ing fundamental knowledge and inventiveness in terms of evident novelty.
Patents form the interface between R&D expenditures and innovations. In
addition to that, intellectual property rights determine the corporation’s
market and technological position (Fattore 1997). Empirical studies like
those of Blau and McKinley (1979), Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984),
Griliches (1990), Crepon, Duguet, and Mairesse (1998), Blind et al. (2003),
and Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley (2005) study the number of patents and
patent applications to consider the development and impact of inventiveness
and knowledge. For instance, Griliches (1990) argues in favor of patents as
an economic and innovative indicator. In his overview, he states the impor-
tance of patentees considering the value of a firm, its competitiveness, and
the technological change.15
In general, the objective of a patent is to protect knowledge in terms of
new products and processes. It covers for a certain time the ownership of an
exclusive right to an invention that can be held by the inventor or assigned
by the inventor to his corporation (German Patent and Trade Mark Office
(GPTO) 2008a).16 An efficient patent system gives incentives for further in-
vestments and innovations within a protected economic environment (Jaffe
and Lerner 2004). In more detail, Fattore (1997) argues that patents encour-
age inventiveness, allow novelties to be exchanged, offer information on the
strength of competitors, and are fundamental to protection and commercial-
ization. Intellectual property rights in terms of patents are one category of a
15 See also Baddeley and Barrowclough (2009, p.137ff) discussing underlying problems
related to the patent variable in measuring innovative output.
16 See GPTO (2008a), p.4ff.
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firm’s pool of intangible assets ensuring costs and revenues (Greenhalgh and
Rogers 2007). Beside that, the European Patent Office (2007a, 2007b) states
the economic importance of patents to an economic area: a larger number of
patents is positively correlated with a higher level of innovations.17 That is, a
patent-friendly environment in terms of low and efficient application and pro-
cess costs incentivizes additional investments. Hence, especially in Germany,
innovation has developed to one of the key topics. The Federal Republic
engages in a national strategy encouraging innovation policy, called “High-
tech Strategy for Germany” (Federal Ministry of Education and Research
2006). Based on the Lisbon Strategy, the objective is a further increase in
domestic productivity and inventiveness.18 Within this program, the patent
system will become more efficient, especially concerning translation costs in
the international context.19
As stated by Baddeley and Barrowclough (2009, p.133) “innovation is
essential for economic growth and development [...].” However, beside the
benefits on the macro-economy level, there are also impacts on the firms’
level as well as to individual people owing to investing in human capital
(Baddeley and Barrowclough 2009). Irrespective of their legal form, corpora-
tions have the option to protect their invention, increase their market value,
and generate additional revenue via patent licensing (Fattore 1997). But,
the owner’s rights are territorially restricted (GPTO 2008a, 2008b). These
characteristics as well as the importance on micro-level justify the study of
patents as a output measure of the innovative activities and their impact
on the organizational structure in the national as well as the international
context. Considering the relationship between a producer and his supplier,
17 See also http://www.epo.org [September, 9th, 2009].
18 The Lisbon Strategy is a European program adopted in 2000 by the European mem-
bers with the objective to raise competitiveness of a knowledge society.
19 See Federal Ministry of Education and Research (2006) and Federal Ministry of
Economics and Technology (2007).
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the innovator has the exclusive rights over his knowledge and decides solely
over its innovative output. This secured environment could lead to the firm’s
decision to favor outsourcing over integration and therewith benefit from a
reduced cost environment. Therefore, a larger pool of knowledge could result
in a positive tenor towards outsourcing. Antras and Helpman (2004) argue
that a rise in productivity favors outsourcing abroad over domestic integra-
tion. However, only the most productive integrate in foreign countries. As
a result, the protection of intellectual rights may induce more outsourcing.
20 The more patents a firm has and the better it is protected by its legal
environment, the lower is the innovator’s hold-up risk that results in verti-
cal disintegration (Merges 1997, Arora and Fosfuri 1998, Hall and Ziedonis
2001). In contrast, the larger the number of patents and therefore the larger
the pool of knowledge, the more unpredictable is the risk of losses and un-
wanted spillovers. Baye (2006) argues that a firm’s position is much improved
by stretching out the time of acquiring a patent. During that period, none
of the innovation’s background is public and therefore the risk of copying
or stealing is reduced.21 The mentioned risks increase through the liability
of publishing the patents’ content.22 This in turn raises the probability of
integration. Moreover, it is crucial whether the producer’s or supplier’s in-
vestment activities are more important to the outcome of the relationship
(Acemoglu et al. 2004). Acemoglu et al. (2004) argue that the larger the
producer’s technological intensity, the more likely is integration. In this con-
text, the risk of a supplier’s ex-post break-up suggests a negative extent to
outsourcing and, hence, integration is more likely to sustain the producer’s
investment incentives. The authors’ empirical study shows that the pro-
ducer’s R&D intensity has a positive impact on vertical integration. Hence,
20 See also Branstetter et al. (2005) for a detailed discussion about the impact of
intellectual property rights on innovation.
21 See Baye (2006), p.164, based on a study by Richard Levin (1988).
22 See also Branstetter et al. (2005), p.4ff.
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the intuition goes in both directions. On the one hand, the larger the pool
of knowledge, the more likely is outsourcing because of cost-saving aspects,
a protected environment, and the chance of trading novelties. On the other
hand, a larger pool of knowledge in the parent firm boosts its importance
and sustains investment incentives via integration (Acemoglu et al. 2004).
2.3 German and Eastern European Innovation Perfor-
mance
Within the European Union Germany is one of the most innovative countries:
it is far ahead the European average and, in a global context, ahead of
the US (PRO INNO Europe 2008). This is shown by PRO INNO Europe
(PIE), an initiative induced by the Directorate-General for Enterprise and
Industry (European Comission). According to their Summary Innovation
Index 2007 (SII) Germany is part of the group of the “innovation leaders”
(PIE 2008, p.7).23 For the last five years this result has been relatively stable
with a slightly raising German performance (PIE 2008, p.12). Moreover,
calculations of years to fall down to the average of the European Union
(EU) are greater than 100 years (PIE 2008). In addition, a subgroup of
the performance indicator is “Intellectual property” measuring innovation
output in terms of patents and trademarks per million population (PIE 2008,
p.35). The indicator shows that the Switzerland and Germany are the best
performers within this dimension (PIE 2008, p.9). Both countries are the
most efficient in transforming innovative inputs into intellectual property
(PIE 2008, p.23). In contrast, the Eastern European countries perform worse
compared to the EU average. These countries are part of the “moderate
innovators” or “catching-up countries” (PIE 2008, p.11ff). However, some
23 The observed countries are classified into the following four groups: “innovation
leaders”, “innovation followers”, “moderate innovators”, and “catching-up countries”.
For the definition of these groups and for further details of the index construction see the
European Innovation Scoreboard 2007 report and its appendix (PIE 2008, p.43ff).
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Figure 1: Summary Innovation Index 2007
of these countries, namely Estonia, Czech Republic, and Lithuania, catch up
the EU average in the short run, more precisely in roughly ten years and
Slovenia is estimated to catch up in about 15 years (PIE 2008, p.12ff). The
report argues that all convergence processes of the other considered Eastern
countries will take more than 20 years (PIE 2008, p.13). Figure 1 presents
the overview of the SII countries for 2007.24
Blind et al. (2003) present a conspicuous trend in both German R&D ac-
tivities and patent applications. Their results show that R&D expenditures
of German firms increased slightly in the 1990s. However, patent applica-
tions doubled during this time. Using data of the European Patent Office
(EPO) from 1991 to 1999, the authors study an average rise of German patent
applications by 8 percent per year. Moreover, the steady growth of patent
24 As stated in the report the data are mainly given for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006
(PIE 2008, p.7).
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filings by residents and non-residents in Germany suggests the prevailing im-
portance due to a rise in the use of the patent system. From 1995 to 2004,
applications by residents to the German patent offices increased by 27 percent
and applications by non-residents increased by 35 percent (World Intellec-
tual Property Organization (WIPO) 2006). Concerning filings by residents,
the German growth rate is larger than e.g. France (15 percent), Japan (10
percent), or the United Kingdom (3 percent). The WIPO (2006) also reports
larger German growth rates by non-residents than e.g. the United Kingdom
with 21 percent. These numbers indicate 2 important findings. First, the
German patent system developed an increasing strength and a high impor-
tance in the protection of knowledge. Germany is one of the top 6 patent
locations, led by Japan and the United States with more than 350,000 and
150,000 applications in 2004 (WIPO 2006). Second, this importance holds
for domestic as well as foreign innovators. It reflects that protection is sought
not only domestically but also in foreign countries (WIPO 2006).25
Figure 2 shows the trend of German patent applications published at the
GPTO and worldwide from 1996 to 2007. Applications by residents increased
from 42,322 in 1996 to 47,853 in 2007. Also total patent applications at the
GPTO raised from 51,833 to 60,922. Therefore, despite the drop of appli-
cations in 2001 and 2002, these numbers show the continuing importance of
German intellectual property rights. Moreover, German patent applications
worldwide also increased from 85,008 in 1996 to 130,168 in 2007. This sug-
gests that international protection becomes more important. In addition,
German R&D expenditures also raised from 30,447 to 44,410 million euros
between 1996 and 2003.26 Therefore, German patent applications as innova-
tive output closely follow the input R&D expenditures. The WIPO (2006)
25 The finding is provided by the WIPO’s (2006) calculation of the worldwide ratio of
non-resident to resident applications: the ratio increased from 1995 to 2001, followed by
a stable outcome until 2004.
26 Source is the Stifterbund (2003/2004)
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reports that the ratio of patent applications per million euros of R&D expen-
ditures decreased slightly from 1.39 in 1996 to 1.07 in 2003. However, the
global ratio also decreased with a final ratio of 0.81 compared with the Ger-
man ratio of 0.92 in 2004 (WIPO 2006, p.l7ff).27 As stated by PRO INNO
Europe (2008, p.24ff), this indicates also that Germany is innovation leader
due to generating intellectual property.
Moreover, Greenhalgh and Rogers (2007) point out the importance of
Germany concerning intellectual property rights. Within their study of
patent applications by domestic residents, Japan and the United States have
the earliest rise and the largest total values of applications, followed, partic-
ularly in the 1990s, only by Germany with rapid rise in patenting. Figure
F2.1 in the Appendix shows the graph by Greenhalgh and Rogers (2007,
p.542). In addition to that, the WIPO (2006) reports that, with 587 resident
patent filings per million population, Germany was the fourth most impor-
tant country in 2004 after Japan (2,884), the Republic of Korea (2,189), and
the United States (654).
To summarize, the given numbers as well as both figures suggest that
Germany is a country that maintains a high level of innovative investments
and a significant growth of the protected knowledge pool.
In addition to the raise of German patent applications owing to domes-
tic protection with an annual average growth of 1.2 percent from 1996 to
2007, global protection seeking also increased. The numbers in Figure 2 sug-
gest an annual average growth of 6.4 percent from 1996 to 2007. Due to
the WIPO Patentreport (2006) 80 percent of all Patent Cooperation Treaty
(PCT) applications are designated to the international context.28
From a residents’ as well as a non-residents’ perspective, (German) patents
27 Sources for the calculations are the GPTO (2008b, 2008c), WIPO (2006), and the
Stifterbund (2003/2004).
28 Sources for the author’s calculations are the GPTO (2006) Annual Reports 2002-2006
and WIPO (2006, 2008).
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are one of the most important rights to achieve returns on innovative activ-
ities. This comes from the fact that in Germany residents at their home
office are the biggest group of filers of patent applications (WIPO 2006).
However, due to the fact that filings from foreign applicants as well as Ger-
man applications in foreign countries have also increased, it suggests that
firms are strengthening their search for a global protection. This in turn
may also influence investment incentives and the decision about the organi-
zational structure both at home and abroad. Thus, the existence of a pool
of knowledge increases the owner’s importance as well as the opportunity of
enhancing profits within a competitive environment, i.e. with low variation
in costs and profits (Aghion and Griffith 2005, Greenhalgh and Rogers 2007).
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3 Intellectual Property Rights and the Orga-
nizational Structure
3.1 Theoretical Background
The changing landscape from a labor-based to a knowledge-based economy is
a main driver of seeking protection for inventiveness. As mentioned, Gross-
man and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) argue that ownership keeps
residual rights and, from a producer’s perspective, reduces a potential hold-
up raised by declining suppliers’ incentives.29 Therefore, the Property Rights
Theory employs the link between a firm’s decision to integrate or to outsource
a part of its production concerning an existing pool of innovations.
Following Grossman and Hart (1986), Acemoglu et al. (2004) develop a
theoretical framework combining technology and the organizational structure
between a producer (he) and supplier (she). The authors distinguish between
three organizational forms: backward vertical integration, VIB, where the
producer employs the supplier. In the case of an ex-post break-up, the pro-
ducer owns all the assets; forward vertical integration, VIF, which describes
the inverse relationship between both parties; and non-integration, NI, where
each of the participants is independent. Acemoglu et al. (2004) argue that
the relationship between the two parties depends on their individual level of
technology. A rise in the producer’s technological intensity makes integra-
tion more likely. It incentivizes the producer’s investments and emphasizes
his importance for a higher overall surplus within the relationship. When the
supplier is the technology-intensive part in the relationship, non-integration
is more likely. If there is an ex-post break-up, her outside option is larger.
This increases her incentives to invest, which also results in a larger surplus
due to her higher importance within the relationship. Therefore, the greater
29 See Acemoglu et al. (2004) and Rasmussen (2004).
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the technological importance of the producer and supplier, respectively, the
more important their corresponding incentives to invest for a higher over-
all outcome. Summarizing, Acemoglu et al. (2004) propose opposite effects
of the producer’s and supplier’s technology intensity on the probability of
vertical integration. The empirical study on British manufacturing plants
provides evidence for the theoretical predictions.
The model establishes the fundament for the following theoretical frame-
work, considering a national and international context in the decision about
the organizational structure. Employing patents as a pool of knowledge, the
model highlights the existence of a threshold between integration and non-
integration. The larger the owner’s pool of knowledge, the more likely is the
owner’s preferred parent-affiliate relationship to maximize outcome; more-
over, the more likely the supplier is to find an alternative partner the larger
is the supplier’s outside option and the more likely is non-integration. This
follows the predictions by Acemoglu et al. (2004) and McLaren (2000). It
holds in the closed as well as the open economy case. However, switching from
a national to an international context may reduce the owner’s influence on his
inventions, e.g. via reduced territorial rights. Intuitively, in both cases, inte-
gration becomes more likely with an increase in the parent’s pool of patents.
However, for a given producer-to-supplier ratio of knowledge, non-integration
holds longer in the open economy case than in the national consideration.
That is, the framework results in a gap between the national and interna-
tional changeover where the probability of international outsourcing rises by
enlarged investment possibilities for the independent supplier. The empirical
study on German and Eastern European affiliates provides evidence for the
theoretical findings.
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3.2 The Basic Model in a Closed Economy
Following Acemoglu et al. (2004), the framework consists of a one-period
relationship between a risk-neutral producer P (parent firm) and a corre-
sponding risk-neutral supplier S (affiliate). The output and investments are
non-verifiable and therefore contracts are incomplete. The timing of incidents
is given as follows. The producer offers an ownership structure z, which, in
the case of the supplier’s acceptance, is followed by the producer’s specific
investments E and the supplier’s specific investments e.30 Two different orga-
nizational forms, namely integration and non-integration, may emerge. This
is motivated by the empirical part of the paper where the German parent
firm decides how to invest in Eastern Europe. Integration (IN) means that
the producer and supplier are an organizational entity. In the case of an
ex-post break-up, the parent firm owns all the assets. Non-integration (NI)
means that each of the participants is independent. In the case of an ex-post
break-up, each party keeps its own investments with certain deductions due
to territorial rights.31 The revenue is split between the two parties according
to symmetric Nash bargaining concerning a given ownership structure z. If
there is no agreement between the producer and supplier, the outcome is as
in the case of NI. The production function is represented by the following
equation:
F (xS, E, e) = λ(
n∑
i=1
sie−
m∑
j=1
pjE + 1)xS + (1− λ)(
m∑
j=1
pjE + 1). (1)
λ refers to the supplier’s fraction in the production function. The larger the
value of λ, the more important is the input good. It is assumed that the
parent firm’s innovation is essential to the output whereas the supplier’s im-
30 See also Acemoglu et al. (2004), p.6.
31 In the case of an ex post break up Acemoglu et al. (2004) impose transfer payments
TP (z) and TS(z) depending on the organizational structure z where TP (z) + TS(z) = 0.
This is also assumed here.
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portance is restricted.32 Moreover, due to an increasing rate of technological
change, the parent firm does not invest in the affiliate’s pool of knowledge.33
xS describes the supplier’s input in the production, which can be 0 (not sup-
plied) or 1 (supplied). In its most simple form, it is provided at no cost
by the supplier.34
∑n
i=1 si indicates the supplier’s capacity for innovation.
The larger the pool and value of knowledge, the larger the outcome of in-
vestments e. Beyond the standardized input xS, the supplier S becomes
more important. j ∈ [1;m] defines the producer’s pool of knowledge. The
greater his inventiveness, hence the larger
∑m
j=1 pj, the greater is the output
of the producer’s investments E.35 However, the producer’s pool of knowl-
edge also restricts the supplier in terms of additional knowledge. Intuitively,
each invention of P poses a challenge for S to generate additional surplus
beyond her standardized input. That is, equivalent innovations do not raise
the relationship’s surplus.
In terms of patents as a category of intangible assets, the inventions are
protected but published and openly visible (GPTO 2008a, 2008b). Here, it
is assumed that P has a pool of innovations protected territorially in the
closed economy. That is, within integration, the supplier as a part of the
corporation also invests within the protected knowledge according to her
incentives. Outside the firm boundaries, a non-integrated supplier either
invests within the licensed territory and her own pool of knowledge or she
invests within the whole pool of innovations, imitating the ideas outside of
their territorial claims. Due to the fact that each party contributes its share,
neither of them is able to undertake the other’s investment.36 Additional
32 The supplier’s importance is restricted as follows: λ ∈
(
0; 1
2
]
. Acemoglu et al. (2004,
p.7) define this ratio as share of costs.
33 This is also consistent with the assumption that the innovator offers the organiza-
tional structure.
34 This assumption is for simplicity. See also Acemoglu et al. (2004, p.7).
35 The inventions are ranked from 1 to k ∈ {n;m} where 1 is a simple invention and k
a highly innovative idea.
36 See also the tacit knowledge assumption by Acemoglu et al. (2004, p.6).
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surplus from the supplier’s investments is given by her own inventiveness i ∈
[m;n] via xs.
37 Therefore, the protected capacity of innovation generates no
additional revenue for the supplier in a restricted national context. Moreover,
if the specialized input is sold outside of the originally intended relationship,
the output suffers from a deduction (1 − δ) where δ is exogenous given and
δ ∈ (0; 1).38 The cost function for party i ∈ {P ;S} and the corresponding
investment activity h ∈ {E; e} is given as follows:39
Ci =
1
2
m∑
j=1
pjh
2. (2)
The utility for each party i, the optimal investment level, as well as the
total surplus in each ownership z depend on the individual relationship-
specific outside options Ozi . Following Acemoglu et al. (2004, p.9), this links
investment incentives and the organizational structure. Due to a potential
ex-post break-up, there are four different outside options. In the case of NI,
an ex-post break-up keeps each party independent. That is, the producer
does not obtain the supplier’s input xS = 0 and therefore the outside option
is
ONIP = (
m∑
j=1
pjE + 1)(1− λ). (3)
The supplier sells her specialized input outside the original relationship
with a deduction of (1−δ) where δ ∈ (0; 1]. Additionally, she is also restricted
to the existing territorial protection of the producer’s innovations j = 1...m.
Therefore, within her pool of knowledge, the remaining outside option in the
case of an ex-post break-up under NI is
ONIS = δ(
n∑
i=m
sie+ 1)λ. (4)
37 It exactly addresses the question of interest: How does the parent’s pool of knowledge
influence the organizational form.
38 See Acemoglu et al. (2004) and McLaren (2000).
39 The form is mainly for mathematical reasons.
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In the case of an ex-post break-up under integration, the producer keeps
all the assets. In more detail, P holds a ratio α with α ∈ [0; 1] of the supplier’s
input investment. An intuition for this might be that P is not able to use
the supplier’s innovations as efficiently as S herself can do.40 The producer
benefits due to the ownership of the input good xS that allows him to sell
the innovation more profitably. Hence,
OINP = (α
n∑
i=1
sie−
m∑
i=1
pjE + 1)(λ) + (
m∑
i=1
pjE + 1)(1− λ). (5)
The supplier’s outside option under IN , OINS , is assumed to be equal to
0. Because S has no influence on the producer’s part of the production, the
remaining investments also do not bring the supplier additional value.
Given an ownership structure z, the utility functions U zP and U
z
S where
z ∈ {NI; IN} are defined as:41
U zi (yi(E, e)) = y
z
i (E, e)− Ci + Ti(z), (6)
where (yi(E, e)) is given by
(yi(E, e)) = O
z
i (E, e) +
1
2
[F (xs = 1, E, e)−O
z
P (E, e)−O
z
S(E, e)]. (7)
At least each party i ∈ {P ;S} generates its own outside option plus one
half of the remaining surplus of the production function. It is certain that
the larger the outside option of party i, the larger the bargaining position
and hence the larger the output yi (Acemoglu et al. 2004, p. 9). Maximizing
the utility functions’ output minus costs with respect to the investments for
each organizational structure results in
40 Acemoglu et al. (2004, p. 8) argue that the supplier would not undertake the
last effective investment in the case of an ex-post break-up. Here, it might also be an
alternative interpretation that S is not able to protect all her knowledge, e.g. because of
lower funds.
41 Following Acemoglu et al. (2004), p.9, according to Nash bargaining for individual
revenues.
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E∗ = 1−
3
2
λ, e∗ =
1
2
λ(1 + δ) (8)
and
E∗ = 1− 2λ, e∗ =
1
2
λ(1− α) (9)
for integration and non-integration, respectively. In both integration and
non-integration, E∗ depends negatively on λ. The more important the sup-
plier, the less important the producer’s incentives to invest.42 Compared
with IN , the total amount of the producer’s optimal investments is greater
in the case of NI. Intuitively, integration allows the parent firm to partici-
pate in the supplier’s whole range of knowledge and investments. Moreover,
larger technological investments increase adaptation costs. This reduces fur-
ther investments. In the case of non-integration, the producer is left to his
own resources. Due to domestic protected knowledge, the prevailing hold-up
problem is reduced. Hence, it allows inefficient low investments by the parent
firm under NI due to territorial protection to be circumvented.43 Regarding
the supplier’s optimal level of investments in the case of non-integration, e∗
is increasing in λ and δ. The larger the outside market and the greater the
importance of the supplier, the higher her investments. This is consistent
with the existing literature, such as McLaren (2000). Under IN , e∗ is re-
duced by α. The larger α, the larger is the amount of inventiveness P can
keep and the greater the supplier’s ex-post break-up losses.
The sum of the utility functions results in the total surplus for each
organizational structure:44
Sz = F (xS = 1, E∗(z), e∗(z)− CP (E∗)− CS(e∗)), (10)
42 See Acemoglu et al. (2004), p.7.
43 Contrary, Acemoglu et al. (2004, p.10) shows that E∗ is largest under IN and e∗ is
largest under NI.
44 See Acemoglu et al. (2004), p.9ff.
23
where Sz consists of the value function F , the optimal investment levels minus
each cost function CP (E∗) and CS(e∗). Therefore, the emerging surpluses S
NI
and SIN allow me to compare the ownership structures for given capacities
of innovation:
SIN − SNI ≥ 0. (11)
From a social planner’s perspective, if the margin is positive, IN generates a
larger surplus than NI and it is the preferred relationship. Suppose equation
11 is set to 0. It enables me to find a threshold that defines the likelihood of
the organizational structure depending on the pool of patents. Computing
the threshold it results in a knowledge ratio
∑m
j=1 pj∑n
i=m si
as follows:45
∑m
j=1 pj∑n
i=m si
=
1
4
α+ 1
8
α2 + 1
4
δ − 1
8
δ
1
2
− 1
4
α− 1
8
α2
≡ Θ. (12)
If the pool of knowledge ratio is larger than the given threshold Θ, integration
is the equilibrium. That is, the larger the parent firm’s pool of knowledge -
compared with the supplier - the more likely is IN . In more detail, the larger
the producer’s pool of knowledge, the more important is the producer. Also,
the input provided is more effective within this relationship. Therefore, inte-
gration raises the producer’s outside option, provides additional protection
for his pool of knowledge, and allows the producer to participate in the sup-
plier’s capacity for innovation. In contrast, the larger the value and number
of the supplier’s inventiveness, the less likely is IN . Her increased outside
option raises investments and the value of her (protected) knowledge.
Moreover, equation 12 suggests that the derivative of Θ with respect to
α is positive. The more P is able to keep of S’s innovations due to the
input, the less likely is IN . Intuitively, the affiliate’s incentives to invest are
too low in the case of integration due to a bad outside option. The overall
45 See Acemoglu et al. (2004, p.27) for the same procedure.
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surplus rises via reducing the parent firm’s outside option by simultaneously
increasing the supplier’s incentives via NI. Hence, non-integration is more
likely. Computing ∂Θ
∂δ
> 0 suggests that a larger number of prospective
partners decreases the need for the supplier to integrate. Therefore, a higher
number of P ’s competitors also boosts the probability of non-integration.
3.3 The Open Economy Case
In terms of knowledge protection, the open economy case compared with
the closed economy framework differs in the patents’ sphere of control. The
assumption is that the protection of knowledge is a territorial right limited
to national borders. That is, within this framework, the parent firm applies
for patents within its national borders. In the international context, it is
assumed that the producer’s knowledge is protected within domestic bor-
ders. However, out of this area, the protection no longer holds. Therefore,
the model addresses differences in the outside options and organizational
structure between a domestic and foreign relationship.
Two countries, Home H and Foreign F , equal in size, are considered.
However, they differ from each other in the innovations’ territorial protection.
FS is defined as a foreign supplier located in the foreign country F . Due to
legal protection of the producer’s knowledge in H, the foreign supplier has
the option to imitate and invest within an existing pool of knowledge. FS
is able to increase her individual surplus by selling the input xs provided
by ideas originally belonging to P outside of the protected environment.
This affects particularly the NI mode. In contrast to the first case, FS is
now by definition allowed to invest within the whole range of ideas i where
i ∈ [1;n]. Additionally, the number of potential partners may change in the
new context. Hence, δ
′
defines the new exogenous given probability for the
foreign supplier to find an alternative partner. Due to the fact that, within
the producer’s pool of innovations, FS and P are potential competitors in
25
the foreign market, their outside options are defined as the following:
ONIFS = δ
′
(
n∑
i=1
sie−
m∑
j=1
pjE + 1)(λ), (13)
ONIP = (
m∑
j=1
pjE + 1)(1− λ). (14)
Maximizing each individual utility of party i ∈ {P ;FS} results in the
following optimal investment levels: E∗ = 1− 3
2
λ+ 1
2
λδ
′
and e∗ = 1
2
λ(1+ δ
′
).
Especially the result for the producer - P invests more compared with the
non-integration mode in the closed economy context - is affected by two
aspects: on the one hand, the loss of territorial protection increases the hold-
up problem and therefore decreases the investment incentives. On the other
hand, increasing the technological frontier and exploiting the existing pool
of knowledge with additional investments allows the producer to boil down
the supplier’s outside option. The new environment results in inefficient
high investments by the producer seeking additional protection. This result
affirms the importance as well as the efficiency of a patent protected area. In
the international context, e∗ differs from the national one in δ
′
. Even though
there is a broader range for FS to invest via an increased i ∈ [1;n], the
investment level e∗ depends on the number of potential recipients settled or
active in F . For instance, if δ
′
> δ, there is no need for integration because
of an increased bargaining power.
In the open economy, OINFS is the same as in the national context. Input
good xs is assumed to be equal to 0. xS goes over to P . Therefore, the pro-
ducer’s production (1− λ) plus a deduction (1−α
′
) of the foreign supplier’s
investments define the outside option,
OINP = (α
′
n∑
i=1
sie−
m∑
i=1
pjE + 1)λ+ (
m∑
i=1
pjE + 1)(1− λ). (15)
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It is assumed that, in an ex-post break-up, P quits the supplier and sells
the whole output. Following the procedure as given in the national case
allows me to calculate the knowledge ratio for the new environment:46
∑m
j=1 pj∑n
i=m si
=
1
4
α
′
+ 1
8
α
′2 + 1
4
δ
′
− 1
8
δ
′2
1
8
+ 1
4
δ′2 − 1
4
α′ − 1
8
α′2
≡ Θ
′
(16)
Comparing the new ratio Θ
′
with Θ suggests that again a larger number
of domestic patents of P makes international integration more likely. The
larger the producer’s pool of knowledge, the more important is the producer
for the overall surplus. It is important to raise his outside option to ensure
that he obtains the input.47 The reverse intuition holds due to the supplier’s
importance of investment activity, that is, the more likely is NI. Because of
being in a non-restricted environment, the supplier’s investments count more
in the NI mode compared with IN .48
Again, the derivative of Θ
′
with respect to α
′
is positive. An increasing α
results in a need for additional incentives for S via non-integration to boost
the total surplus. It also holds that a thicker outside market for the supplier
raises the probability of non-integration.49
To sum up, the value of domestic patents has the same impact on the
organizational structure in both contexts. The greater P ’s inventiveness,
the more likely is IN . The reverse effect holds for the affiliate’s pool of
innovations. The larger α
′
, the more P can keep, and the more likely is
outsourcing in the international context according to the national mode. For
46 The optimal investment levels E∗ = (1− 2λ) and e∗ = 1
2
λ(1− α) are unaffected.
47 This follows from ∂S
IN
−SNI
∂
∑
m
j=1
pj
> 0.
48 Increasing the supplier’s space for investment from the national to the international
context does not necessarily increase his investment incentives. The supplier’s outside
option under non-integration ONIFS is limited by the producer’s innovation pool brought to
the market.
49 The intuition concerning δ in the international context is twofold. It means if δ
′
is above a critical value δTR the threshold between integration and non-integration is
decreasing with respect to an increasing outside market δ
′
. In this case P would not
invest anything, which is in terms of an existing pool of innovations, inefficient. The
Appendix to the paper shows the proof.
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certain values for α, the outside market δ has a positive impact on non-
integration. If δ increases, the effect turns over to incentivize the producer’s
pool of knowledge. Moreover, further assumptions on the level of the outside
parameters allow me to compare both thresholds Θ and Θ
′
. Assuming δ = δ
′
and α = α
′
results in a counterintuitive outcome against the traditional
view.50 The following Section 3.4 suggests both outcomes, the traditional as
well as the the new view where an increasing amount of innovation favors
outsourcing.51
3.4 Implications
For simplification, it is assumed that δ = δ
′
and α = α
′
. This allows me
to compare the derived thresholds in the protected and unprotected con-
texts. Due to δ
′
, the comparison of the two ratios shows that the interna-
tional threshold is always larger than the national one. This results from
the difference between Home and Foreign that is given by 1
8
+ 1
4
δ
′
< 1
2
.52 It
suggests that more patents lead to a greater probability of IN . However,
within a certain range, the result also affirms the existence of the opposed
outcome. Compared with the national context, despite an increasing pool of
the producer’s knowledge within this range, non-integration is the dominant
relationship. Figure 3 shows the result for both cases.
Intuitively, less protection and a larger pool of the parent firm’s innovation
result in integration. This holds in the national as well as the international
context. However, the gap between the two cases shows that non-integration
holds longer in the unprotected context. The reason is that, in the inter-
national context, the supplier is always able to invest within the producer’s
existing pool of knowledge independently of the organizational structure. For
the parent firm as well as the total surplus, it is efficient to use the additional
50 See Mol (2005), p.572ff.
51 See Mol (2005), p.572ff and p.575ff, for the description of the two perspectives.
52 Both ratios show the same nominator Ω as well as the expression ǫ = 1
4
α
′
+ 1
8
α
′
2.
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Figure 3: Domestic vs. foreign relationship
incentives for the supplier’s investment to obtain a greater surplus. This
holds up to a certain point where the producer’s pool of knowledge becomes
too important and counteracting investments of the producer are too costly.
The equilibrium turns over into integration. That is, the producer is able
to exploit the difference between the territorial protection modes. Moreover,
the more the parent firm can keep from the affiliate, the lower her incentives
to invest. Hence, an increase in a expands the gap between the changeover
from non-integration to integration in both cases.53
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Dataset
The empirical analysis relies on a data matching for 14,322 Eastern Euro-
pean investment projects of 929 German firms. Data are provided by the
pan-European micro database Amadeus released by the Bureau van Dijk
53 Holding δ = δ
′
constant, an increase in α
′
with (α < α
′
) results in a rise between Θ
and Θ
′
. A rise in δ
′
incentivizes the supplier via outsourcing. However, if α
′
is sufficiently
large, an increase in δ
′
results in a total surplus of non-integration below the integrative
surplus. In this case Θ
′
< Θ suggests that in the national context the outsourcing mode
holds longer than in the international framework.
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(Bureau van Dijk, Electronic Publishing 2005). The underlying version cov-
ers data for 1.5 million companies in 38 European countries. Beside consol-
idated and unconsolidated data concerning firm-level information for up to
13 years, it contains the direct ownership share between a parent firm and
her subsidiary for 2005. The data do not cover financial institutions and
insurance companies. Information on the ownership structure is limited to
2005. All other variables on firm-specific characteristics are available from
1993 to 2005. More precisely, the underlying data cover unconsolidated infor-
mation on German firms and their corresponding direct affiliates located in
Germany and Eastern Europe. Each firm is matched with information about
its patent activity. These data are obtained from the German Patent and
Trade Mark Office. The unique database is constructed by adjusting all the
firm-specific information consisting of the firm name, firm address, founding
year, and firm history (like ownership, industry, and products). That is,
the data cover a cross-sectional study on the number of patent applications
granted of each German parent firm investing in Germany and Eastern Eu-
rope.54 Beside the information about granted patent applications, the data
are also matched with information about the severity of imitating the parent
firm’s products. This addresses the problem of catching a firm’s innovation.55
The data on imitation are provided by a unique survey of the Chair for In-
ternational Economics, University of Munich, about German firms investing
in Eastern Europe.56
4.2 Descriptives and Estimation Methodology
To study the impact of inventiveness on the organizational structure, the
dummy variable IN defines the ownership share within each parent-affiliate
54 Eastern Europe covers Central Eastern Europe, Southern Eastern Europe, the Baltic
States, and the Former Soviet Union. For the whole list of countries, see Table T2.1 in
the Appendix.
55 See also Belenzon and Berkovitz (2007).
56 I would like to thank Dalia Marin for providing me these data.
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pair. The variable is equal to 1 if the ownership share is larger than 50
percent, otherwise it is 0. To find a more proper answer to whether par-
ent companies favor integration over outsourcing due to an increasing pool
of innovations (i.e. in terms of reflecting a transaction inside the firm (off-
shoring) versus an arm’s-length transaction (outsourcing)), an alternative
measure is constructed that defines the threshold at the 35 percent level.57
As already mentioned in the literature survey, Antras and Helpman (2004,
p.575) argued that only the most productive firms within the headquarter-
intensive sectors favor integration over outsourcing. Therefore, the parent
firm’s working capital-to-labor ratio K/L is included as well as the firm’s
labor productivity deviation ˙Y/L compared with the sample average produc-
tivity. Following the theoretical predictions by Antras and Helpman (2004),
for both variables a positive coefficient is expected. AffRat measures the
number of affiliates in the corresponding investment country over the total
number of affiliates in the rest of the world.58 The variable is motivated by
Mol (2005). It suggests that a larger number of foreign subsidiaries makes
non-integration more likely. On the one hand, parent firms, already having
invested in a foreign partner country, are more familiar with potential local
suppliers and therefore non-integration is more likely due to lower searching
costs.59 On the other hand, relocating activities outside the firm boundaries
is driven inter alia by costs savings related to fixed costs. These are also
obtained via outsourcing. The pool of knowledge is measured by intangi-
bles per worker, namely Intangibles, and patent applications (granted after
2004) per worker, namely Patents. Intangibles can be understood as an
objective variable measuring insubstantial values in a firm. The patent vari-
able is closer related with innovations in terms of intellectual property rights.
57 The ownership share in the underlying dataset ranges from 0.01 to 100 percent. See
Marin (2006) for a further discussion on the threshold.
58 The ownership share is at least larger than 25 percent.
59 See Mol (2005), p.577.
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However, contrary to intangibles, it does not measure the real value of in-
novations in a firm. Therefore, this yields the baseline specification, which is
described by the following equation:
INmodeijk = β0 + β1(K/L)ik + β2(Y/L)ik + β3AffRatik
+β4log(L)ik + β5IPRik + ϑik + uik
(17)
where IN depends on the definition of the 50 or 35 percent modus given for
each firm pair between parent company i and the corresponding affiliate j
for each investment project k. The variable IPR is replaced by the parent
firm’s pool of patents and intangibles, respectively. In this context, the null
hypothesis βIPR = 0 means that innovation has no influence on the owner-
ship structure decision. Against the null hypothesis, if βIPR 6= 0 significantly
holds, there is an influence on the left-hand side variable explaining the dif-
ference between outsourcing and offshoring. The theoretical model predicts a
positive impact of the parent firm’s pool on integration. Moreover, depend-
ing on the regression specification, parent and affiliate firm characteristics
are also included (e.g. number of employees, affiliate’s outside option). Un-
observed country- and firm-specific factors are controlled for by including a
vector ϑik representing a set of legal form distinctions, country-specific, and
industry-specific dummies, where the industry component is included at a
NACE Rev.l 2-digit classification. In the Appendix, Table T2.2 presents the
definitions and sample statistics for the underlying investment projects.
The sample statistics shows that the patent variable has a maximum of 8
patents per employee and a standard deviation of 0.2. Excluding firms with-
out any granted inventions shows an average value of 0.03 and a standard
deviation of 0.3. The slight increase suggests that the variables’ informa-
tion is reliable without increasing their variance dramatically. This is also
confirmed by the average patent application compared with Belenzon and
Berkovitz (2007). They find a mean of 4.17 patents per firm whereas the
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underlying German patents in this study show an average of 7.4 per firm.60
Table 1 delivers a first insight into the relationship between patents and
integration. For different samples, namely investments to Eastern Europe,
investments to Germany, and overall investments, a larger pool of inventive-
ness is related to integration. That is, a larger mean of patent applications
over all the investment projects in each sample is related to a larger ownership
share between parent and affiliate.
Table 1: Patent applications and integration
Sample Non-integration Integration
CEE 37 (250) 53 (1172)
Germany 73 (1492) 77 (4687)
Total 68 (1742) 72 (5859)
Notes: Mean of German patent applications (granted) over all
available firm pairs. Sample sizes are in parentheses. Integration
means a ownership share larger than 50 percent.
Sources: Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk 2005), GPTO (2008b,
2008c), and Chair for International Economics, University of Mu-
nich. Author’s calculations.
Using the whole information on the parent’s ownership share instead of
the binary variable on integration also suggests that an increasing pool of
patents in 2004 boosts the probability of a larger ownership share level. Fig-
ure 4 presents the finding in each case. For both German affiliates and
Eastern European affiliates, it holds that an increasing pool of knowledge
raises the direct ownership share. However, a pool larger than 30 patents
lowers the relational share. Intuitively, each patent category shows a greater
probability for integration in the foreign context compared with the domestic
context.
The result also holds when the data are separated into small and medium-
60 Belenzon and Berkovitz (2007, p.3) study a total of 50,000 patents held by 12,000
European firms.
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tional Economics, University of Munich. Author’s calculations.
Figure 4: Domestic vs. foreign affiliates
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sized firms (SME) with a number of employees smaller than or equal to 500
and firms with an employee number of more than 500 (large firms). Both
SMEs as well as large firms are more integrative if they have a higher number
of granted patent applications. The distribution of the firm size suggests that
the results are driven by both the innovative German SMEs as well as large
firms: 55 percent of the parent firms show a size smaller than 500 employees
and 45 percent a size larger than 500 employees.
4.3 Empirical Results
Equation 17 is estimated cross-sectionally with fixed effects to control for
omitted variables. Due to the limited dependent variable, regressions are
run by the nonlinear method of maximum likelihood estimation. The non-
linear regression model (probit) allows me to study the impact of inventive-
ness on the organizational structure. The sub-samples differentiate between
Germany and Eastern Europe to verify the theoretical predictions about do-
mestic and foreign outsourcing. To produce valid statistical inferences, the
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. Whereas the dependent variable
is given for 2005, the independent variables are given for the period t-1.
Table 2 presents the results for investments in Germany. The decision to
integrate, where the binary variable is equal to 1, is regressed on the parent’s
pool of intangible-to-employee ratio. Moreover, the affiliate ratio as well as
the productivity measure and the firm size are included as controls. Column
(1) shows that an increase in the pool of intangibles raises the probability
of integration. The coefficient is highly significant and in line with the the-
oretical predictions. The capital-to-labor ratio is insignificant, which gives
no evidence about the relationship between headquarter intensity and off-
shoring. However, the most productive choose integration over outsourcing
(Antras 2003). This results from the positive and highly significant coeffi-
cient on (Y/L)ik. Additionally, the larger the number of domestic affiliates
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and the larger the firm size, the more likely is non-integration. This is sug-
gested by columns (2) to (4). Both coefficients AffRat and log(L) are highly
significant at the 1 percent level. The results also hold when industry- and
firm-specific dummies are included.
Table 2: Organizational structure in Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(K/L)P -0.082 -0.251 0.308 0.133
[0.271] [0.768] [0.819] [0.336]
(Y/L)P 0.009*** 0.019*** 0.005 0.013**
[3.382] [4.898] [1.333] [1.943]
AffRat -0.111 -0.158** -0.214*** -0.235***
[1.565] [1.981] [2.774] [2.938]
Log (L)P -0.063*** -0.05***
[3.834] [2.807]
(Intang)P 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006***
[7.417] [6.408] [4.937] [4.276]
Fixed effects no no yes yes
Observations 3210 3210 3197 3197
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.06
Dependent variable: Integration
Notes: Probit estimation with a constant (not shown), robust z statistic in brackets.
The dependent variable is equal to one if the direct ownership share is larger than 35
percent, otherwise zero. For a detailed definition of the variables, see the descriptive
section. Fixed effects are defined as a set of industry- and firm-specific dummies. *,
**, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
If an increasing producer’s pool of knowledge raises the probability of
integration, I expect similar results for the more specific patent variable.
For the same set of observations, Table 3 presents the results for replacing
intangible assets with the firm’s pool of patents. Columns (1) and (2) suggest
that the positive sign of the coefficient is as expected. Unfortunately, the
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coefficients on PatP are insignificant. The negative sign on the capital-to-
labor ratio (K/L)P is contrary to the expectations. However, in the following
more reliable specifications (3) and (4), the coefficient turns its sign and
becomes insignificant. The negative sign on the affiliate ratio suggests that
an increase in the number of domestic affiliates is accompanied by a fall
in the probability of the integrative outcome. The same holds for the firm
size, which is intuitive due to cost-saving aspects. Both variables are highly
significant. Including fixed effects, column (3) shows a significant coefficient
on patents. Again, it has the predicted sign and confirms the theoretical
predictions.61
61 All the presented results also hold in the case of a dependent variable differing at a
50 percent threshold instead of a 35 percent threshold.
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Table 3: Patents and the organizational structure in Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(K/L)P -0.5354* -0.5579* 0.1329 0.0629
[1.670] [1.717] [0.340] [0.159]
(Y/L)P 0.0198*** 0.0187*** 0.0134*** 0.0130***
[5.256] [4.977] [2.674] [2.587]
AffRat -0.1558** -0.2152***
[2.073] [2.824]
Log (L)P -0.0857*** -0.0916*** -0.0626*** -0.0675***
[5.620] [5.707] [3.732] [3.930]
(Pat)P 0.4259 0.1534 1.0269 0.8189
[0.539] [0.194] [1.281] [1.026]
Fixed effects no no yes yes
Observations 3228 3228 3215 3215
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05
Dependent variable: Integration
Notes: Probit estimation with a constant (not shown), robust z statistic in brackets.
The dependent variable is equal to one if the direct ownership share is larger than 35
percent, otherwise zero. For a detailed definition of the variables, see the descriptive
Section 4.2. Fixed effects are defined as a set of industry- and firm-specific dummies.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
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In order to check the theoretical predictions in the international context,
Table 4 present the familiar set-up for investments in Eastern Europe con-
sidering intangibles as a measure of the pool knowledge. Beside the firm and
industry dummies, affiliate country dummies are also included. Through-
out all the specifications, the coefficient on IntangP suggests that offshoring
is more likely than international outsourcing with an increasing pool of in-
tangibles. The fact that the coefficient on the affiliate ratio is now positive
suggests that the more familiar the producer is with the foreign environ-
ment, the more likely is an integrated relationship. Therefore, the firm may
prefer an employment’s relocation to a country where the hold-up risk is
high (Marin 2006). In terms of a potential knowledge spillover, the larger
the danger of losses to countries with weak property rights, the more likely
is integration (Nunn and Trefler 2007). Moreover, AffRat could also repre-
sent the parent firm’s outside option. That is, the larger his outside option,
the more likely is his preferred relationship (Acemoglu et al. 2004). The
coefficient is significant throughout all the specifications. Although the co-
efficient on Y/LP is only significant in specification (3), the direction of the
impact is as expected. The capital-to-labor ratio is negative, which suggests
a capital-intensive producer is more likely to favor international outsourcing
over offshoring.62
Turning to the regression results with the pool of patents instead of in-
tangibles affirms the results already given. In the first two sets of spec-
ifications, PatP is positive but insignificant. Column (3) shows a larger
z-statistic whereas the coefficient in column (4) is statistically significant at
the 5 percent level. Moreover, the impact of the other variables is as given
before. K/LP suggests that the extent of reducing labor costs via offshoring
is higher than in the risky case of outsourcing. The firm’s productivity mea-
62 All the presented results also hold in the case of a dependent variable equal to 1
if the ownership share is larger than 35 percent and equal to 0 if the ownership share is
below 35 percent. The coefficients are slightly less significant.
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Table 4: Organizational structure with Eastern European countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(K/L)P -0.9364** -0.8884* -0.3886 -0.3463
[1.994] [1.917] [0.678] [0.601]
(Y/L)P 0.0296 0.0158 0.0748** 0.0637
[1.174] [0.492] [2.202] [1.440]
AffRat 0.8536** 0.9163** 0.7694* 0.8212*
[1.998] [2.059] [1.668] [1.686]
Log (L)P 0.0229 0.0185
[0.623] [0.398]
(Intang)P 0.0053** 0.0051** 0.0127*** 0.0125***
[2.165] [2.172] [3.098] [3.206]
Fixed effects no no yes yes
Observations 579 579 560 560
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.12
Dependent variable: Integration
Notes: Probit estimation with a constant (not shown), robust z statistic in brackets.
The dependent variable is equal to one if the direct ownership share is larger than 50
percent, otherwise zero. For a detailed definition of the variables, see the descriptive
Section 4.2. Fixed effects are defined as a set of industry- and firm-specific dummies
as well as dummies controlling for the Eastern European countries. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
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sure has the expected coefficient but is insignificant, which results in further
specifications without this variable. Again, AffRat is positive and significant.
Log(L)P is also positive and significant in the last specification. Marin (2006)
argues that labor costs can be reduced most effectively by choosing integra-
tion rather than non-integration. Therefore, a labor-intensive firm chooses
integration over non-integration. The intuition is given by a typical hold-up
risk that increases along with weak property rights the costs of organizing
the activity outside the firm boundaries. To obtain an idea of the importance
of the affiliates’ outside option, columns (3) and (4) also include the variable
OoA. The coefficient shows a negative sign, which affirms the theoretical pre-
dictions by McLaren (2000). The larger the number of similar producers in
the Eastern European country and, therefore, the larger the supplier’s out-
side option, the less her hold-up risk in non-integration and the more likely is
an arm’s-length relationship between the two parties. Moreover, it increases
the supplier’s incentives to invest (Acemoglu et al. 2004).
The larger the pool of the parent firm’s intellectual property rights, the
more likely is integration. This result also holds across the whole sample of
domestic and foreign German investments. Table 6 presents the results using
probit and OLS to analyze the marginal effect of innovation on offshoring.
The first two columns in Table 6 present a significant coefficient of PatP .
It indicates that, over all the investments, a larger pool of parental knowledge
favors integration. The linear probability model in column (2) suggests that
an additional patent increases the probability of integration by 37 percent.
Including the affiliate ratio, columns (3) and (4) show a reduced impact of
knowledge on the organizational structure. The marginal effect is positive
and about 30 percent. The significance is equal or close to the 10 percent
level. Following Amemiya (1981) and Camron and Trivedi (2005), the vari-
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Table 5: Patents and organizational structure in Eastern Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(K/L)P -0.9294** -0.8853* -0.7195 -0.2029
[1.993] [1.933] [1.607] [0.388]
(Y/L)P 0.0221 0.0059
[0.881] [0.187]
AffRat 0.8653** 0.9369** 0.6757* 0.548
[2.025] [2.112] [1.774] [1.357]
Log (L)P 0.0267 0.03 0.0604*
[0.756] [1.190] [1.905]
(Oo)A -0.0005** -0.0009**
[1.966] [2.022]
(Pat)P 6.9617 6.4598 3.2887 6.2284**
[1.506] [1.519] [1.642] [2.007]
Fixed effects no no no yes
Observations 582 582 670 658
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.11
Dependent variable: Integration
Notes: Probit estimation with a constant (not shown), robust z statistic in brackets.
The dependent variable is equal to one if the direct ownership share is larger than 35
percent, otherwise zero. For a detailed definition of the variables, see the descriptive
Section 4.2. Fixed effects are defined as a set of industry- and firm-specific dummies
as well as dummies controlling for the corresponding Eastern European countries. *,
**, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
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Table 6: Organizational structure: Probit vs. OLS
Probit OLS Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(K/L)P 0.2265 0.0731 0.1801 0.0586
[0.797] [0.874] [0.629] [0.692]
(Y/L)P 0.0098** 0.0029** 0.0092** 0.0028**
[2.433] [2.535] [2.300] [2.414]
AffRat -0.2006*** -0.0681**
[2.644] [2.550]
Log (L)P -0.0473*** -0.0138*** -0.0515*** -0.0154***
[3.508] [3.635] [3.760] [3.975]
(Pat)P 1.2676* 0.3704** 1.0866 0.3167*
[1.778] [2.048] [1.536] [1.745]
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 3770 3783 3770 3783
Adj./Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Dependent variable: Integration
Notes: Probit (OLS) estimation with a constant (not shown), robust z (t) statistic in
brackets. The dependent variable is equal to one if the direct ownership share is larger
than 50 percent, otherwise zero. For a detailed definition of the variables, see the
descriptive Section 4.2. Fixed effects are defined as a set of industry- and firm-specific
dummies (including the firm’s legal form as additional control). Country dummies
controlling for the corresponding German and Eastern European countries are also
included. Similar results are obtained by the 35 percent definition of integration.
Here, the patent variable is less significant, equal or close to the 10 percent level. *,
**, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
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ance between OLS and probit is an effect of values with a probability below
0.1 as well as above 0.9. Additionally, all the other variables suggest the
expected intuition. Therefore, the presented results affirm the reliability of
the estimated coefficients as well as the theoretical predictions as outlined in
Section 3.63
The theoretical part predicts that the changeover from non-integration to
integration takes longer when the parent firm invests abroad compared with
the changeover in purely domestic investments. In order to control for this
difference, the starting point is presented by column (1) in Table 7. Using a
linear probability model, as presented in Table 6, the positive sign of the co-
efficient on the productivity measure suggests that only the most productive
integrate (Antras 2003). Considering log(L)P , the larger the firm’s endow-
ment of employees, the more likely is outsourcing. Moreover, when investing
abroad, the loss of the territorial protection and therefore the increased hold-
up risk boosts the probability of integration between the parent firm and the
supplier. This is suggested by the included country dummy, which is equal
to 1 if the German parent firm invests in Eastern Europe and equal to 0
if the firm invests in the domestic market. All the mentioned variables are
significant at the 1 percent level. To test the theoretical prediction of an
increased likelihood of non-integration in CEE compared with investments
in Germany, column (2) includes an interaction between the country dummy
and the pool of parental knowledge. All the coefficients show the expected
signs. Unfortunately, the coefficient on PatP and the interaction term is
not significant. However, the negative sign of the coefficient on the interac-
tion term suggests that the theoretical framework is correct in predicting a
longer tendency towards non-integration when the inventive parent firm goes
63 Using the 35 percent definition of the integration measure suggests the same impact
of each variable. Only the significance of PatP is slightly below the given values in Table
6.
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abroad. Due to the fact that the impact could be driven by the firm size,
column (3) presents the same specification set for the sub-sample of SMEs.
This method takes account of the highly inventive medium-sized enterprises,
especially in Germany. Whereas the employment measure becomes insignif-
icant, the negative and significant sign of the coefficient on the interaction
term gives empirical evidence for the theoretical prediction as outlined in
Section 3. First, the larger the capacity for innovation, the more likely is
offshoring. Second, international outsourcing holds longer for a given knowl-
edge ratio when SMEs are investing abroad. Intuitively, due to a limited
endowment, SMEs prefer outsourcing to incentivize the supplier additionally
to invest within the whole range of innovations. It brings additional surplus
that is not available in the national context. However, in the international
context, it is also true that a rising knowledge pool increases the producer’s
hold-up risk and therefore shifts the emphasis to the producer and his need
to obtain (a part of) the input.
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Table 7: Gap in the organizational structure
SME
(1) (2) (3)
(K/L)P 0.0089 0.0122 -0.0063
[0.117] [0.148] [0.066]
(Y/L)P 0.0029*** 0.0029*** -0.2322
[3.072] [3.071] [1.608]
Log (L)P -0.0108*** -0.0108*** -0.0003
[3.411] [3.408] [0.023]
(Pat)P 0.2359 0.246 0.8081***
[1.531] [1.422] [2.672]
Country 0.1235*** 0.1239*** 0.064
[8.641] [8.548] [1.572]
(Pat)P * country -0.0893 -0.7252*
[0.370] [1.938]
Fixed effects yes yes yes
Observations 3821 3821 916
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.04 0.06
Dependent variable: Integration
all firms
Notes: Linear probability estimation with a constant (not shown), robust
t-statistic in brackets. The dependent variable is equal to one if the direct
ownership share is larger than 35 percent, otherwise zero. For a detailed
definition of the variables, see the descriptive Section 4.2. The country
dummy is equal to one when the parent firm invests in Eastern Europe
and it is equal to zero when the firm invests in Germany. Fixed effects are
defined as a set of industry- and firm-specific dummies. Fixed effects also
include affiliate country dummies controlling for the corresponding Eastern
European countries. Similar results are obtained by the 50 percent defini-
tion of integration. In the 50 percent set-up, the variables present a even
higher significance level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1
percent levels, respectively.
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4.4 Robustness
This section discusses the robustness of the empirical findings. To address
the potential problem of endogeneity, the following tables report a number
of alternative measures and methods. The results affirm the theoretical pre-
dictions as well as the empirical findings.
Table 8 starts with a probit estimation in the German sub-sample. In-
stead of dividing the innovation measure by the number of employees, it
reports the results for the coefficient on the knowledge variable per firm’s
value added. Column (1) presents the results for the firm’s intangible assets
IntangV A. The coefficient is as expected and significant at the 1 percent
level. The larger the ratio of the assets, the greater is the pool of intangibles
within the parent firm’s added value. Therefore, as the theoretical framework
predicts, the more likely is integration. Columns (2) to (4) also suggest that
this holds for both the patent measure as well as for the decision about the
organizational structure in Eastern Europe. Moreover, all the other variables
present the expected coefficients, which suggests that the results are not sen-
sitive to the inclusion of value added. Again, the sign of the coefficient on
productivity is positive, suggesting that only the most productive choose off-
shoring over outsourcing. Columns (5) and (6) show the results using probit
and OLS over all the investments, respectively. Both coefficients on PatV AP
are significant and positive: the larger the pool of knowledge within the value
added, the more likely is integration.
Running the same specifications including the interaction term between
foreign investments and knowledge presents the predicted impact. However,
the coefficients are less significant. Additionally, the same set of specifications
is run on firms with a value of patents larger than 0. Again, the coefficients
show the predicted signs but they are less significant (below the 15 percent
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Table 8: Robustness: organizational structure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(K/L)P -0.0631 0.095 -0.4484 -0.5248 0.1145 0.0347
[0.157] [0.277] [0.755] [0.916] [1.405] [1.591]
(Y/L)P 0.0151*** 0.0113** 0.1011** 0.0885* 0.0103** 0.0030**
[2.827] [2.483] [2.065] [1.854] [2.473] [2.536]
AffRat -0.2158*** -0.2138*** 0.5821 0.7875 -0.1815** -0.0630**
[2.828] [2.689] [1.191] [1.573] [2.413] [2.407]
Log (L)P -0.0765*** -0.0686*** -0.0206 0.0116 -0.0519*** -0.0153***
[3.925] [4.231] [0.415] [0.235] [3.588] [3.744]
(IntangVA)P 1.1348*** 2.6092*
[2.963] [1.849]
(PatVA)P 2.539** 4.1282 2.5127** 0.5435**
[2.119] [1.159] [2.215] [2.469]
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2959 2977 472 475 3457 3469
Adj./Pseudo R2 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.07
Dependent variable: Integration
Germany Eastern Europe Whole sample
Notes: Probit estimation with a constant (not shown), robust z-statistic in brackets. The dependent variable is equal
to one if the direct ownership share is larger than 35 percent, otherwise zero. For a detailed definition of the variables,
see the descriptive Section 4.2. Fixed effects are defined as a set of industry- and firm-specific dummies. Fixed effects
also include a country dummy controlling for the corresponding countries in Eastern Europe and Germany. The
underlying estimation method from columns (1) to (5) is probit; for comparison reasons in column (6) the underlying
method is OLS. The parent firms’ intangible assets and patents are divided by the firms’ value added. *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels, respectively.
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level). In order to control for the fact that a parent firm owns an existing
pool of innovations, the patent measure’s information is reduced to a binary
variable. It is equal to 1 if the firm owns at least one filled patent and 0
otherwise. The regressions are run for probit and OLS as well as for the
sub-sample of SMEs. Throughout all the specifications, the patent dummy
is positive and significant at least at the 5 percent level. There is only weak
empirical evidence for the theoretical prediction that outsourcing holds longer
in the international context. The coefficient on the interaction term is, close
to the 15 percent level, not significant. Moreover, the dependent variable is
also changed from a binary to a continuous variable ranging between 0 and
100 percent. Despite low significance in the Eastern European sub-sample,
all the variables show the right impact and an underlying significance as
presented before.
In the literature, it is argued that innovation is influenced by various
determinants.64 Additionally, it is possible that the organizational structure
has an influence on inventive activities. Moreover, freed resources could also
be useful for further investments in costly patent proceedings. It could be the
case that outsourcing frees resources and these in turn are used for further
innovation (Glass and Saggi 2001). This would imply that the knowledge
variable is correlated with the error term. Therefore, the coefficient on the
knowledge variable is biased due to simultaneous causality. The following
results take account of this problem.
The patent variable is instrumented by a measurement of the possibility
to imitate the parent firm’s products. The variable copy ranges from 1, which
means that the products can be easily imitated, to 3, which means that ex-
traordinary efforts are necessary for imitation. The variable is reconstructed
by a binary code that is equal to 0 if imitation is easy and 1 otherwise, hence
64 See Griliches (1990, 1992), who gives a survey of the empirical literature addressing
innovation.
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large or extraordinary efforts are necessary.65 To obtain reliable results, a
valid instrument must be correlated with the problematic patent variable and
must be exogenous, that is, uncorrelated with the error term. The instru-
ment’s relevance can be tested in the first stage of the instrumental variables
regression:
PatP = β0 + β1copyik + β2(K/L)ik + β3(Y/L)ik
+β4AffRatik + β5log(L)ik + ϑik + vik,
(18)
where the binary patent variable is regressed on the instrument copyik. Table
9 reports the first-stage results. The sign of the coefficient on copyik is nega-
tive and significant. Intuitively, the easier the possibility to imitate (costly)
products, the more likely is seeking patent protection. If it is difficult to
imitate the product, it is protected by itself and the less likely is territorial
protection. From this perspective, copy appears to be a relevant instrument.
Because equation 18 is exactly identified, exogeneity cannot be tested. From
an intuitive perspective, the decision about the organizational structure has
no influence on the existing pool of knowledge of the parent firm. The vari-
able measures the active evaluation of the possibility to imitate an existing
product before the decision about patenting investments is made. Therefore,
the assumption of exogeneity is fulfilled. Table 9 presents the results.
Columns (1) and (2) suggest that an increasing pool of knowledge boosts
the probability of integration. The coefficient is significant for both thresh-
olds. Moreover, the capital-to-labor ratio is also positive and significant in
column (1). Unfortunately, the sign of the coefficient on productivity turns.
Contrary to the previous results, the impact is negative. However, it becomes
insignificant in column (2). It is noticeable that the number of observations
falls by more than 50 percent. This is induced by the limited availability of
65 The variable comes out of a unique data survey of 660 global corporations in Austria
and Germany, University of Munich. For further information see Marin et al. (2003).
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Table 9: 2SLS regressions: organizational structure
50% 
threshold
35% 
threshold
50% 
threshold
35% 
threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(K/L)P 0.3268** 0.1363 0.2523* 0.1273
[1.97] [0.95] [1.759] [0.935]
(Y/L)P -0.0083** -0.004 -0.0095*** -0.0060***
[2.09] [1.35] [3.360] [2.936]
AffRat 0.0452 0.033 0.0606* 0.0551**
[0.97] [0.98] [1.663] [2.150]
Log (L)P 0.0091 0.0074 0.003 0.0058
[0.85] [0.82] [0.340] [0.727]
(Pat)P 0.4469*** 0.2236** 0.5618*** 0.3466***
[2.80] [1.94] [4.495] [3.853]
Country 0.1505** 0.1306**
[2.135] [2.276]
(Pat)P * country -0.2693*** -0.1726**
[2.682] [2.099]
-0.302*** -0.279***
[6.73] [7.92]
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 1179 1179 1179 1179
Adj./Pseudo R2 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03
Dependent variable: Integration
R
2 
= 0.64R
2 
= 0.44First-stage results
Notes: 2SLS estimations with a constant (not shown), robust t-statistic in brackets.
The dependent variable is equal to one if the direct ownership share is larger
than 50(35)percent, otherwise zero. For a detailed definition of the variables, see
the descriptive Section 4.2. Fixed effects are defined as a set of industry- and
firm-specific dummies. Fixed effects also include a country dummy controlling
for the corresponding countries in Eastern Europe and Germany. Patents are
instrumented by copy, a variable that is equal to zero if parent firm goods can be
easily copied and one if imitation is not possible or only with extraordinary efforts.
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
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the variable copy. Columns (3) and (4) study the effect of the second theoret-
ical prediction about the difference between domestic and foreign investments
on the organizational structure. The results provide empirical evidence for
the theoretical predictions. A larger pool of inventiveness increases the prob-
ability of integration. However, outsourcing holds longer when the parent
firm invests abroad. This is suggested by the negative coefficient on the
interaction term, which is significant.66
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the determinants of the organizational structure of Ger-
man firms investing in Eastern Europe. Following Acemoglu et al. (2004),
the theoretical framework predicts that a larger pool of parental knowledge
increases the probability of integration. This holds in both the national and
international contexts. However, in the foreign case, the decision to out-
source holds longer. In more detail, there are three key predictions within
the theoretical framework. First, the larger the domestic pool of knowledge
at the parent firm’s level, the more likely is integration. Second, this finding
holds in the national as well as in the international context. Along with Ace-
moglu et al. (2004), the carrier with the higher capacity for inventiveness
has to be incentivized by his preferred organizational form. Third, territorial
protected knowledge also increases the likelihood of international outsourc-
ing. That is, the outcome of outsourcing holds “longer” with an increasing
parental pool of innovations in the international context compared with the
territorially protected national case. Moreover, the framework suggests that
(i) the larger the number of potential partners for the supplier, the more
likely is non-integration, which is also in line with McLaren (2000); (ii) the
66 As stated by Acemoglu et al. (2004, p.23), some problems may occur because of
treating both the patent variable and the concerning interaction simultaneously as en-
dogenous.
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larger the parent firm’s possibility of keeping knowledge of the supplier, the
more likely is outsourcing.
The empirical analysis provides evidence for the theoretical predictions
using (i) the European micro database Amadeus(Bureau van Dijk 2005)
matched with (ii) data from the German Patent and Trade Mark Office
(2008) and (iii) a unique data set from German firms investing in Eastern
Europe. The results indicate that, for German parent firms investing in Ger-
many and Central and Eastern Europe, integration is more likely the larger
their pool of knowledge. This holds for both measures given by intangibles
and the number of patents. Beside that, productivity is positively related
to the change from outsourcing to offshoring (Antras and Helpman 2004).
Because of an obvious existence of specification problems, robustness checks
are run to confirm the obtained empirical findings. An instrumental variable
regression also suggests that the results are consistent with the theoretical
predictions. It confirms the existence of a gap in the outsourcing decision
between home and abroad. Because the empirical findings are based on the
definition of innovation, different measures are conceivable. Therefore these
provide the further proceeding in future research, especially in the interna-
tional context of the drivers of the decision on the organizational structure.
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Appendix
I. Proof
Proof of the outside market due to the international case
The first derivative of θ
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The intuition is given as follows. The larger the affiliate’s likelihood to find
an alternative partner outside the intended relationship, the larger her in-
vestments. However, the investments on the producer level are also larger
under non-integration than integration. This results from the production
function in the firms’ legally protected environment: the producer is able to
increase the supplier’s space for value-creating investments via reducing his
investments and therefore costs in the integration mode. Outside the rela-
tionship, the producer’s outside option is solely increasing his investments.
Therefore, to increase his output and to reduce the foreign supplier’s outside
option using parental innovation, the parent firm increases her investments
counteracting the supplier’s investment. Hence, the greater the incentives for
the supplier, the larger the producer’s efforts to limit the independent sup-
plier. These efforts are strengthened in the international context because the
foreign supplier is legally allowed to invest in the whole pool of innovations.
This restriction of the supplier increases the costs of investments and re-
duces the total surplus compared with integration. Therefore, the likelihood
of integration is increasing in a greater δ
′
.
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II. Tables and Figures
Table T2.1: Central and Eastern European countries
Albania Macedonia, FYR
Belarus Moldova
Bosnia and Herzigovina Poland
Bulgaria Romania
Croatia Russian Federation
Czech Republic Serbia and Montenegro
Estonia Slovak Republic
Hungary Slovenia
Latvia Ukraine
Lithuania
Source: Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk 2005) and Chair for International Eco-
nomics, University of Munich.
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Table T2.2: Definition of variables and sample statistics
Variable Obs. Definition Mean Min. Max. Stand. Dev.
L 11038 Number of employees 2,975.93 1 208,199 14,208.66
Y/L 7592 Deviation of productivity among German par-
ent firms.
3.61 -0.999 38.6 9.65
K/L 9075 Parent firm’s capital-to-labor ratio (th USD) 1,476 0 55,737 3,177
Intang 9158 Parent firm’s intangibles-to-labor ratio (th
USD)
22.7 0 2,218 91.2
Pat 11159 Granted patent applications per employee 0.01 0 8 0.19
AffRat 14318 Ratio of the parent firm’s number of affiliates
in German (CEE) to the rest of the world.
0.56 0.003 9 0.41
Sh 13524 Number of recorded shareholders of the parent
firm
19.91 0 74 19.56
Oo 2259 Affiliate’s outside market: Equal producers
working in the same sector and market as the
prevailing parent firm
164.21 1 577 242.36
IN 7602 Dummy equal to one if parent’s ownership share
is greater than 50 (35) percent, otherwise zero.
Dummy=1, 5860 (6534) obs.
Imitat 4852 Dummy equal to zero if imitation of the parent
firm’s product is easy, otherwise equal to one if
imitation is not possible or only with extraodi-
nary efforts
Dummy=1, 2273 obs.
Country 14322 Dummy equal to one if investment project is
located in CEE, equal to zero if it is located in
Germany
Dummy=1, 4107 obs.
Sources: Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk 2005), GPTO (2008b, 2008c), and Chair for International Economics, University of Munich. Author’s calculations.
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Source: Greenhalgh and Rogers (2007), p.542.
Figure F2.1: Patent applications by domestic residents
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